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We analyse the results of an experiment on expectation formation carried out last year (i.e., 
2003) in the CREED laboratory in Amsterdam. The experiment involved 78 participants, who 
were asked to predict prices in artificial single-good economies, and were paid according to their 
accuracy in doing so. Thirteen markets, with six subjects each, were created, in two different 
treatments. The first treatment concerns a Cobweb-like commodity market with supply-driven 
expectations feedback. The second treatment concerns a speculative asset market with demand-
driven expectations feedback. In the first treatment price fluctuations are relatively stable, 
quickly converging to the Rational Expectations fundamental value. In the second treatment 
prices do not converge quickly, but tend to display a slow oscillation around the fundamental 
price. An important factor in generating these differences is shown to be the strong coordination 
of price predictions among participants. This suggests a large degree of homogeneity in the 
expectation rules applied by the participants, which was confirmed by explicitly fitting the 
individual predictions to a linear adaptive autoregressive specification.  
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1. Introduction 
In February 2003 an experiment on expectation formation was carried out in the economics 
laboratory at the University of Amsterdam. In total it involved 78 participants, mostly students of 
economics and students coming from neighboring faculties. The participants were asked to 
predict prices in artificial single-good economies and were paid according to their forecasting 
accuracy. Thirteen such economies were created, by dividing the participants into random groups 
of six. Of those groups, six formed a supply-driven cobweb-like economy, characterised by a 
negative price expectations feedback system, and seven formed a demand-driven asset pricing-
like economy, characterised by a positive expectations feedback system. Actually, the experi-
mental models had been designed to differ only in the sign of their expectations feedback effect. 
All economies were run for 50 time periods, and all of them had an endogenous price develop-
ment, except for a small amount of added noise. The objective of the experiment has been to 
study the influence of market structure on individual price expectations and on the resulting 
stability properties of prices, by applying two canonical models that are each representative of a 
large class of markets, and comparing their results. 
The experiment that is the topic of this working paper has been the last of a series of experi-
ments on expectations formation directed by the CeNDEF research group over the last few years. 
The results from these experiments, in which also Cars Hommes, Jan Tuinstra and Joep Sonne-
mans were involved, have been bundled and analysed in a PhD thesis by Henk van de Velden 
(2001)
1. Much like the experiment of this paper, the main goals of Van de Velden's research were 
to study price expectations formation in cobweb- and asset pricing-like models, and to compare 
the results. As it turned out though, the second of these goals was difficult to achieve directly, 
since the two models, aside from having opposite expectations feedback effects, were burdened 
by an important asymmetry in the prediction horizon of the participants. That is, because of 
peculiarities in the models' design, participants in the Asset Pricing treatments were asked to 
predict the market price of two periods ahead, while participants in the Cobweb treatments could 
suffice with next period predictions (pp. 3-4). Qualitative differences in the results could there-
fore not easily be ascribed to either one of the two model asymmetries, considerably hindering 
any comparison. In the present setup both models have been restructured so as to preserve their 
essential characteristics, but, at the same time, reduce their differences to the expectations 
feedback sign only. Thus, the feedback sign can hereafter be held responsible for any difference 
in results between treatments
2. 
                                                           
1 Two parts of which, Hommes et al. (2004a) and Hommes et al. (2004b), are to be published as 
seperate articles. 
2 It is beyond the scope of this working paper to further treat here the literature connected to the 
present research. Suffice it to say that prominent related articles are Lei, Noussair & Plott (2001), 
Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988) and Schmalensee (1976), while the main theoretical inspi-
ration comes from Brock & Hommes (1997). Recently, Leitner & Schmidt (2004) have reported an Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  2
2.  Stucture of the artificial economies 
The participants were randomly divided into groups of six and every group was then placed 
in one of two artificial economic environments
3. In both environments, participants were asked in 
each time period to predict the market price of the following period, while on their computer 
screens a graphical and numerical record was kept of past market prices and their own predic-
tions of those prices. By assuming the demand and supply functions to be fixed in all cases, the 
participants' predictions in each group then generated the true market price, to which only a 
small random shock was dealt, preventing trivial developments. Once the new price was calcu-
lated, the records on the computer screens would be updated and, except of course in the final 
time period, the participants would again be asked for their predictions of the next period. It is 
important to keep in mind that the two models in the experiment have been designed to bear each 
other an almost perfect resemblance, disturbed only in the feedback sign of price expectations. 
The first of the artificial economies used in the experiment was based on a Cobweb model. 
This model has been designed to represent markets for a non-storable consumer good or semi-
good, which are driven mainly by price predictions and resulting production decisions of the 
suppliers, rather than by comparable predictions and decisions of consumers
4. In the experiment 
a market maker version of the Cobweb model was used, meaning that equality between demand 
and supply in each period is not required, but that the market price is constantly adapted in the 
direction of the excess demand, the trade gap itself being absorbed by a hypothetical market 
maker. Thus, it is the difference between demand and supply that drives the price development. 
Increasing price predictions lead to increasing production, a decreasing excess demand and 
therefore lower prices, causing tendencies in expectations to produce a reverse effect in market 
prices. The following price adjustment formula was used: 
11 ,,
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Between the brackets the excess demand is depicted. D And S are the demand and supply curves 
respectively, while nh,t and H are the market shares of the producers in the economy and the 
number of producers respectively. They are equal to 1/6 and 6, since each producer is associated 
                                                                                                                                                                    
experiment on expectation formation in the international currency market. Their experiment is 
related to our Asset Pricing treatment, and yields comparable results. 
3 Actually, the experiment consisted of four sessions, performed on four seperate occasions. At 
the start of each of the sessions, the participants were randomly grouped. See Appendix A for 
details about the experimental design. 
4 The Cobweb model apparently originates from an article by Kaldor (1934). Subsequent to its 
discovery, it was mainly applied to markets for agricultural products such as pigs, from whence 
the expression "hog cycle" derived, and corn (see, e.g., Ezekiel (1938) and Nerlove (1958)). Later, 
the application of the model was broadened, with notable applications to job market fluctuations 
(e.g. Freeman (1976)). An important new field of application for the Cobweb model might be the 
market for computer microchips, which seems to show many of its typical characteristics 
(Economist 1996a, 1996b, 2001). Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  3
with a single participant and the producers have equal and constant shares in the market. The 
market maker adjusts the market price proportionally to the excess demand, using some positive 
value for λ, and makes a slight error ε in the process
5. In the Cobweb treatment, the participants 
act as advisors to the producers in the market, so their individual price expectations ph,t
e deter-
mine aggrgate supply. The demand and supply functions are taken to be linearly decreasing and 
linearly increasing respectively. A demand functio n  o f  t h i s  f o r m  i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  m i c r o -
economic principles, while a linearly increasing supply function is implied by the assumption that 
the producers have quadratic production costs
6.  
It is important to note here that the quantity between brackets in equation (1) is never 
actually realized on the market, but is rather a crude anticipation by the market maker of excess 
demand in time period t. This seemingly unconventional market structure is actually generated by 
the production lag that is characteristic of the Cobweb model. This lag forces the producers to 
come up with a price estimate of the next period and commence production based on it, before 
the actual price becomes known, in our case as a result of calculations by the market maker. 
Therefore, assuming that the market maker can observe either the price expectations directly 
together with the supply functions, or the resulting magnitudes of production, it would be only 
natural for him to attempt to use this information in the calculation of the next period's price. 
Equation (1) is actually a specific case of such a correction to the price adjustment calculation, 
with the supply quantities based on the predictions for time period t-1 being entirely replaced by 
the quantities based on the most recent predictions
7. Our reason for choosing this particular 
market structure has been to create a maximum of symmetry between the two treatments, as will 
become clear from the description of the positive expectations feedback model below.   
The second of the artificial economies the participants were confronted with consisted of an 
Asset Pricing model. Usually, such a model is said to describe the price development of a 
financial asset, such as a stock or an option, by comparing in some way demand and supply for 
this good. An excess of demand would characteristically lead to an increase in the asset price, 
and an excess supply to the reverse. Since in the experiment demand was taken to be an 
increasing function of the price predictions, as would be natural in the case of a stock or an 
option, our Asset Pricing treatment was driven by a positive expectations feedback system, 
which, to a certain extent, confirmed any tendency in the participants' belief about future prices. 
The basic pricing formula was chosen to be the following: 
                                                           
5 Without loss of generality though, the noise term can be multiplied by 1/λ and moved to within 
the brackets, allowing it to be interpreted as a demand shock, which may seem more credible. 
6 The producers are assumed to behave homogeneously. The supply function is explicitly derived 
in the mathematical appendix. 
7 If our interpretation of equation (1) seems unrepresentative of Cobweb-like models in practice, 
it is important to note that the parameter choices in the experiment also make it equivalent to the 
more traditional equilibrium version of the Cobweb model. This equivalence is shown in the 
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In this recursive equation prices are, as in the Cobweb model above, adapted by a market maker 
in proportion to the excess in demand, which is shown between brackets on the right hand side. 
After this adaptation, they are slightly distorted by a randomly varying amount denoted by 
epsilon
8. Within the brackets, a constant supply of assets z
s is subtracted from aggregate demand, 
which consists of a sum of the individual demand quantities of the traders on the market. It is 
assumed that the participants function as advisors to these traders, informing them of their 
predictions ph,t
e, which the traders then use to calculate their demand functions. In this sense, the 
Asset Pricing market fundamentally differs from the Cobweb market, for the latter is primarily 
supply-driven and therefore requires participants to submit their predictions to producers instead 
of buyers. Since six participants form a group in the experiment and the traders are again defined 
to have an equal market share, nh,t equals 1/6 and H equals 6. The specific shape of the demand 
function, in which yt represents a stochastic dividend with variance σ
2  generated by the asset, r 
equals the risk-free rate of return, such as one would normally get on a savings deposit, and a 
equals the coefficient of risk aversion, is derived using mean-variance optimization
9.  
In the experiment, the parameters in the Cobweb equation (1) have been chosen in such a 
way as to allow for a reasonable amount of convergence potential, to obtain symmetry in 
expectations feedback properties with the second model presented below, and at the same time 
to keep mathematics as simple as possible. To satisfy these principles, the feedback effects of 
both realized and expected prizes were required to have specific values, in their turn restricting 
parameter choice. Assuming that price expectations rules are equal among participants, feedback 
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Firstly, we take the market to be fundamentally well-behaved, which is to say that prices 
converge globally to the fundamental price under naive expectations rules. After substituting for 
naivety, the derivatives in (3) can be added, making the requirement for global convergence that 
λ (d+s) fall between zero and two. Secondly, we remove entirely the state variable feedback, 
denoted by the first derivative in (3), to ease comparison between the two models and to simplify 
                                                           
8 Similarly to the Cobweb model, ε can be put inside the brackets and interpreted as a supply 
shock, if so desired. 
9 This derivation can be found in the mathematical appendix to this working paper. In particular, 
it requires that the traders have a constant absolute risk aversion and that they believe the 
dividend proces to be normally distributed. It is again assumed here that the economic behavior 
of the traders is completely homogeneous. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  5
further calculations. This requires us to set λ equal to 1 /d, at the same time equating the product 
above to 1+s/d, which necessitates the slope of the supply function to be absolutely smaller 
than the slope of the demand function. Selecting, based on these considerations, suitable values 
for the remaining parameters
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Similarly, the first-order derivatives generated by Asset Pricing equation (2), assuming unifor-
mity of the participants' prediction rules, are listed below: 
22
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To achieve symmetry between both treatments, so that they differ only in the sign of the ex-
pectations feedback, it is necessary to set the first derivative equal to zero and the second to λ. 
Assuming that in both models the market maker uses the same price adjustment parameter, these 
restrictions imply that aσ
2 =1 an d  λ =1 /(1+r). Making the remaining parameter choices in ac-
cordance with the interpretation of equation (2)
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3.  Inspection of the experimental data 
At the end of the experiment, each of the thirteen groups had generated a series of 50 market 
prices along with six series of predicted prices, of the same length. Also, each of the participants 
had answered a set of questions regarding the experiment and themselves, and was paid a sum of 
money proportional to the accuracy of his predictions
12. 
The results of the first six groups, assigned to the Cobweb treatment, are shown in Figure 
                                                           
10 That is, s was set equal to 1, d to 21/20 and λ to 20/21. Furthermore, the intercept of the demand 
function was chosen to be 123 and the distribution of the noise term was taken to be normal, 
specifically N(0,1/4). It will be verified in the mathematical appendix that with these parameter 
choices the fundamental price is equal to 60. The feedback effects in (3) imply that prices will 
globally converge to it in an alternating manner under naive expectations.  
11 That is, y=4, σ
2=1/4, a=4 and z
s=1.r=1/20 Already follows directly from the last restriction 
for λ. The distribution of the noise term was again defined to be N(0,1/4). These parameter values 
produce a fundamental price of 60, the same as in the Cobweb model, with prices globally 
converging monotonically under naive expectations. See the mathematical appendix for details. 
12 The questionnaire consisted of a total of 22 questions, mostly on the participant's behavior 
during the experiment and on background information that might have influenced the results. The 
participants were paid according to a quadratic scoring rule, allowing them to earn a maximum of 
half a euro for a perfectly accurate prediction. See for details Appendix A. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  6
#1
13. The six corresponding graphs show considerable similarity. In all cases, the first few time 
periods demonstrate relatively large fluctuations of prices and price predictions around the 
fundamental price, which then peter out quickly, in most cases well before the tenth period. After 
this initial volatile phase has been completed, market prices and predictions remain very close to 
the fundamental price, except for some incidental outliers in predictions, causing a deviation in 
the market price, which is though never large enough to destabilize the system
14. These rough 
qualitative features suggest that the Cobweb market structure generates great stability in the 
price development. It might even be supposed, if an entry phase of a few periods is respected and 
thus excluded from further analysis, that the market prices do not deviate significantly from those 
under the assumption of rational expectations, that is, from a purely stochastic move-ment 
around the fundamental price. Verification of this hypothesis would be remarkable, since the 
participants have been provided only with a bare minimum of information of the market, as is 
described in Appendix A, and, in particular, were not informed of the explicit demand and supply 
functions. This question, and others related to it, will be addressed in the following sections. 
The results of the seven groups assigned to the Asset Pricing treatment are shown in Figure 
#2. Again there is much similarity between the graphs in the figure, though in a manner different 
from the Cobweb case. The initial phase leading to coordination among the price predictions of 
the participants is now much shorter, in most groups only one time period. On the other hand, the 
coordination of beliefs, unlike in the Cobweb setting, here does not automatically generate con-
vergence of the market price to the fundamental price. Therefore, though the price predictions 
tend to be very close to each other within each of the seven groups, the market price only 
occasionally is very close to the fundamental price. This imperfection seems to be slowly 
alleviating, since most graphs apparently demonstrate a dampening oscillatory movement around 
the fundamental. There also seem to be exceptions to this supposition however, most notably in 
graphs (b) and (g), in which the market price rather seems to hover over the fundamental price, 
making it unclear whether long-term convergence will be achieved. An interesting difference with 
the Cobweb treatment lies in the occasional outliers in individual forcasts. These appear to have a 
much greater effect on the market price and on the other predictions, in some cases resulting in 
disrupting the market price development by inflating the apparent oscillatory movement
15. In the 
following sections, the extent to which the Asset Pricing markets converge to the fundamental 
price will be investigated, and particular attention will be paid to the individual expectation rules, 
which, in this particular context, seem to prevent fast convergence. 
Earnings by the participants were almost uniformly close to the greatest possible amount, in 
both the Cobweb and Asset Pricing treatments. They are depicted in Figure #3 for all 78 partici-
                                                           
13 All figures will be collected in Appendix C, all tables in Appendix D. 
14 Examples can be found around period 36 in graph (c) and around periods 21 and 41 in graph 
(e). All perturbations seem to be due to errors made by single participants. 
15 The clearest case of such a disruption occurs at period 7 in graph (e), while other examples are 
periods 15 and 25 in graph (f). Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  7
pants, categorized according to session and group number
16. The closeness of the individual 
earnings within the groups and, excepting only the second group in graph (d), between groups, is 
an implication of the strong coordination among price predictions that groups in both treatments 
tend to exhibit
17. In the Cobweb model, such coordination is feasible only when it occurs close to 
the fundamental price, since in other cases the participants would be making obvious large errors 
en masse. In the Asset Pricing model though, coordination among participants does not restrict 
the market price to an area around the fundamental, since a unanimous deviation from the funda-
mental price produces a similar effect in the market price, allowing it some freedom of move-
ment, which is then restricted by the absence of rational bubble solutions and the stability of the 
model under naive expectations
18. Given the fact though, that, during the experiment, participants 
were unable to observe any of the other group members' price predictions, it is quite remarkable 
that the qualitative features from the group results in general seem to comply with the above 
analysis. The only way in which this apparent synchronization of price prediction movements can 
be explained is by the absence of any significant ideosyncracies in the procedure through which 
individuals form expectations. Thus, it seems there is a surprising amount of coordination in the 
participants' behavior, both in the Cobweb and the Asset Pricing treatment. In the following 
sections, an attempt will be made to formally describe this general type of expectation formation. 
An interesting question with regard to the earnings of the participants is whether the limited 
amount of variance that is present among them can be explained to some extent by group 
membership or by personal characteristics. Table #1 in Appendix D shows the results from a least 
squares regression of the earnings on a selection of personal information, derived from the 
questionnaire, and group membership dummies. Surprisingly, nearly all of the variance can be 
explained by the variables that remain after restricting the significance level to 5%. Both personal 
information and group membership appear relevant in explaining the differences in earnings 
between participants.  
Regarding the questionnaire variables, easily intelligible results are the positive coefficient 
signs with the variables "maximize income" and "made effort", indicating roughly that participants 
who described themselves as being profit maximizing, highly motivated individuals derived from 
this attitude a positive income effect. More difficult to interpret are the negative coefficient signs 
with the variables "age" and "study unknown". They are probably due though to the participation 
                                                           
16 In the first pair of sessions the Cobweb treatment was performed and in the second pair the 
Asset Pricing Treatment. All sessions were made up by three groups of participants, except for 
the last one, made up of four groups. For details, see Appendix A. 
17 Looking at graph (e) of Figure #2, it is easy to understand why this group's members have been 
by far the worst performing in the Asset Pricing treatment. Still, when the market price reenters 
the graph after the enormous shock at time period 7, all but one of the predictions already follow 
nicely in its path, suggesting that is is not a general lack of coordination, but rather an incidental 
desastrous error, that makes the group earn so poorly. 
18 The non-existence of explosive movements in the market price under rational expectations is 
shown in the mathematical appendix. For the global stability of both models under naive expec-
tations, see Section 2. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  8
of several older students and non-students in the experiment, who seemed to be less accurate 
than the younger student-participants.  
The entries for the binary group variables clearly indicate the relatively large between group 
variance in earnings, since all but four of them, of which one is the reference variable, are highly 
significant. The coefficients show that the Cobweb groups as a whole earn less than groups #1, 
#3, #4 and #7 of the Asset Pricing treatment, but also that it cannot simply be said that Cobweb 
groups generally do worse than Asset Pricing groups, since Asset Pricing groups #5 and #6 also 
show considerable negative coefficients. This ambiguity in ordering the treatments according to 
earnings of their participants may be caused by the earlier observations that, on the one hand, the 
volatile entry phase takes longer to complete in the Cobweb treatment, but, on the other hand, 
the market price development in the Asset Pricing treatment is less trivial and more sensitive to 
prediction shocks. On the whole, the results from Table #1 show that in most cases group 
membership has a greater influence on earnings than individual characteristics have, which is 
consistent with the conjecture that the amount of heterogeneity in participants' prediction rules is 
small, and, in particular, that prominent individual characteristics like gender, type of education 
and cultural background do not significantly influence earnings. 
4. Phase  of  Entry and Convergence 
In the first period of the experiment, participants provided their estimates for that period's 
market price without having any information about prior market developments. Since they had 
read only a brief introduction about the general characteristics of the artificial market, in this first 
period they could do little more than give an arbitrary number between 0 and 100. In the periods 
following the beginning, this information shortage naturally alleviated, though the quality of 
predictions would indirectly still be impaired by the deliberately impulsive birth of the markets 
and the subsequent volatility in realized prices
19. The testing of unambiguous hypotheses regar-
ding the experimental data requires, though, that an assumption of stationarity can reasonably be 
made. Therefore, it is necessary to discard a certain number of time periods at the beginning of 
each of the data series, which approximately contains all the excess volatility due to market 
initialization. Between the treatments, the amount and the duration of this volatility varies 
greatly, so the amount of periods discarded will be seen to differ as well. 
Figure #4 reproduces the results from the first groups of the Cobweb and Asset Pricing 
treatments. These groups are taken to be fairly representative for their treatments as a whole, so 
they will be used for expository purposes in this section. In both graphs of the Figure, dashed 
vertical lines have been drawn intersecting early time periods. At t=1, represented by the y-axis 
                                                           
19 The reason for not informing the participants of all the market characteristics explicitly was to 
keep the fundamental price from acting like a focal point, as could, for example, easily occur if 
the participants were shown a figure with the Marshallian cross associated with their treatment 
prior to the experiment. In such a case, pseudo-rational behavior would ensue that would have no 
practical relevance. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  9
in both graphs, price predictions are more or less arbitrary, generating, as one would expect, a 
market price above the fundamental in the Cobweb group and one below it in the Asset Pricing 
group. At t=2, the participants are aware of last period's market price and their own prediction 
of it, so they have a limited amount of data on which to base their second prediction. Since they 
only know one realized market price though, they cannot yet form an image of the way in which 
the price develops, so in both graphs we see a high proportion of naive expectations of the 
second market price.  
It is at this point that an important difference arises between the two treatments. In the Cob-
web group, because of the negative expectations feedback, the market price sinks below the fun-
damental price, denying most of the participants any earnings this period. In the Asset Pricing 
group, the situation is radically different, with the market price keeping at the same side of the 
fundamental, allowing some participants to already achieve near-maximum earnings, though the 
market price itself is quite far away from the fundamental. Obviously, after the second time peri-
od has been completed, participants start to think very differently between both treatments. In 
the Cobweb group, they are strongly motivated to avoid naive expectations in the coming period, 
while in the Asset Pricing group it probably seems a good idea not to deviate much from naivety.  
At t=3, we see indeed that naive predictions are largely avoided in the Cobweb group. Since 
the information set of participants now contains two market prices and their predictions of them, 
obvious alternatives are a linear extrapolation of the realized prices or some average of these 
prices and the predictions of the last period. Looking at graph (a) at the second dashed line, it 
seems that most group members have opted for the latter, resulting in a market price that is much 
closer to the fundamental value, though many predictions are still not very nearby. Looking at the 
same time period in graph (b), we see a much better performance. As was expected, participants 
have largely retained their naivety, pushing the market price slightly towards the fundamental, as 
is required by the global stability of the market under such expectations. 
When the way in which the participants of the Asset Pricing group form their expectations in 
the third time period is compared to the way they do so the rest of the experiment, it cannot be 
said, at least after just a quick glance at the data, that there are major differences. It seems that 
the main reason for this behavioral consistence is the observation that the general characteristics 
of the market price development as a whole are already incorporated largely in its first two 
realizations. That is, a participant who simply predicts a linear extrapolation of the last two 
market prices, maybe adjusting slightly towards his last prediction or the last realized price, 
would do very well in the experiment, while he might have invented such a rule in the third 
period. Therefore, in the Asset Pricing treatment, the minimum amount of time periods that 
should be discarded to allow an assumption of stationarity to be made, is two. 
In the Cobweb groups, the first time periods tend to be less coordinated than in the Asset 
Pricing case, so it is natural to suppose that more than two time periods should be discarded for 
further analysis. Indeed, in graph (a) at t=3, it is clear that the participants cannot be expected to Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  10
foresee the alternating behavior that the market price is about to display. One period ahead, 
though, they have witnessed the absence of monotinicity that is characteristic of all negative feed-
back systems under naive expectations, which does put them in a position to find an expectation 
rule befitting the structure of the market they participate in. The minimum number of time peri-
ods to be discarded in the Cobweb treatment should therefore equal three. 
Inspecting graph (a) of Figure #4 at t=4, it becomes clear immediately that the earliest 
moment when participants might theoretically adopt a succesful expectation rule is not neces-
sarily equal to the moment in which the majority actually does so. At t=4, the accuracy of the 
group as a whole is actually worse than the period before, though afterwards it improves strongly 
within a few time periods. Therefore, it seems wise to allow the participants a short learning 
period in addition to the few initial periods already discussed above, so as to be sure that the 
volatile beginning of the markets has no meaningful effect on the data series that will hereafter be 
analysed. A reasonable criterium to determine the end of such a learning phase would be, for 
each of the treatments separately, to set it equal to the first time period in which a majority within 
each group, that is at least four participants per group, first succeeds in submitting a prediction 
that comes very close to the realized price. If this criterium is fulfilled, it is very likely that statio-
narity of the prediction rules can be assumed, since even groups with strongly erratic beginnings 
by then show a certain amount of coordination on the market price, while the equality of market 
shares, as demonstrated in equations (1) and (2), ensures that accurate participants now domi-
nate price determination everywhere. 
Define the above criterium as the Majority Criterium and define the set of time periods prece-
ding the period for which the Criterium is fulfilled as the Phase of Entry. Both concepts are 
dependent on what "coming very close to the realized price" is said to mean. Taking into account 
the noise that is, in each period, added to the market price, "very close" will here be interpreted as 
deviating no more than five percent from the market price of the same time period
20. The length of 
the Phases of Entry, for the Cobweb and the Asset Pricing treatments respectively, is shown in 
Figure #5. Graphs (a) and (b) show the number of participants predicting close enough to the 
market price, per group and on average. Both graphs initially show a monotonous increase in the 
number of sufficiently accurate participants, covering virtually the whole range between zero and 
six. Once these average numbers reach the top they stay near it, only decreasing a little when 
prediction mistakes are made in specific groups. From the graphs the duration of the Phases of 
Entry can easily be derived. In the Asset Pricing treatment, the Majority Criterium is satisfied at 
t=4, giving the Phase a length of three, and in the Cobweb treatment, in which the increase of the 
                                                           
20 This level of accuracy implies that, if the market price will be equal to the fundamental price of 
60, participants are "very close" to it if their prediction lies between 57 and 63. In other words, the 
distance should be less than six standard deviations of noise. Since rational players would almost 
always come to within two standard deviations, participants are required to have roughly one-
third of the best-attainable accuracy. These demands become less strict if the market price will be 
higher than the fundamental, and stricter if it will be lower, reflecting the fact that the interval of 
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average number of accurate participants is less steep, it is satisfied at t=8, implying a duration of 
seven
21. In the rest of this working paper, market prices and price predictions dated before the 
end of the relevant Phase of Entry shall be excluded from the analysis. 
It was already mentioned that, at least for the Asset Pricing treatment, coordination of price 
predictions does not by itself imply convergence of the market price to the fundamental value. 
This conjecture can be further refined by drawing a pair of graphs resembling the accuracy 
graphs of Figure #5, but counting rather the number of predictions that are sufficiently accurate 
relative to the fundamental price. These graphs are contained in Figure #6. Graph (a) strongly 
resembles its equivalent in Figure #5, which is logical, since after the Phase of Entry market 
prices in the Cobweb groups were, on the whole, very close to the fundamental value. Comparing  
Graphs (b) of Figures #5 and #6, on the other hand, reveals no similarity whatsoever. In the Asset 
Pricing groups, market prices are in general not very close to the fundamental value, though in 
most groups the market price passes several times through the fundamental, and, as was already 
hypothesised, there seems to be a tendency towards long-term convergence. These three obser-
vations are all reflected in graph (b) of Figure #6. Firstly, the graph shows average values that are 
much lower than comparable values of the accuracy graphs before it. Secondly, it shows upward 
and downward spikes in average values at time periods when many groups happen to cross, 
respectively not to cross, the fundamental price
22. And thirdly, the evident tendency of the 
accentuated line to rise over the fifty period range suggests that general convergence can indeed 
be achieved if the experiment were repeated and run over a greater number of time periods
23. 
5.  Coordination and Overreaction 
Both graphs of Figure #5 show that, when the Phase of Entry is complete, virtually all partici-
pants succeed in keeping their predictions very close to the market price. However, graphs (a) 
and (b) of Figure #4 demonstrate at the same time that predictive accuracy is not a sufficient con-
dition for convergence of the market price to the fundamental value. That is, graph (a) does 
demonstrate such convergence approximately, while graph (b) does only slightly, at least within 
50 time periods. It seems therefore, that, at least in the Asset Pricing treatment, despite of the 
                                                           
21 In Figure #4, dashed lines have been drawn along these time periods following the end of the 
Phases of Entry. These are then followed only by a pair of lines lying three periods ahead, at t=11 
and t=7 respectively, which marks the lower boundaries of the sample range that will be used in 
Section 6, when a specification with three price lags will be estimated on the data to identify 
individual expectation rules. 
22 As can be checked by comparing with Figure #2. For example, between time periods 10 and 20 
all but the last of the Asset Pricing groups pass through the fundamental, producing three spikes 
in graph (b). Between periods 35 and 40, only groups #2 and #5 do not get close to the funda-
mental, resulting in two more spikes. Just after 40, all market prices are above the fundamental 
price, producing a long downward spike. 
23 Assuming that all Asset Pricing groups would have shown convergence to the fundamental 
price if they would have been allowed to continue for a longer time, the aggregate qualitative 
features of the results in the Asset Pricing treatment can be appropriately summarized with the 
phrases "fast coordination" and "slow convergence". The analogous phrases for the Cobweb 
treamtment would then be "slow coordination" and "fast convergence". Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  12
general accuracy, there exists a tendency towards a specific collective bias that prevents the 
market price from converging easily, as it would do for example under naive expectations. Such a 
tendency would be equivalent to the tendency towards blind coordination of price predictions 
identified in Section 3.  
An easy way of quantifying expectation coordination in the sense of the above is suggested by 
the following error decomposition:   
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Obviously, the decomposition applies to the results of a single group, in which t* denotes the time 
period when its treatment as a whole fulfills the Majority Criterium and the superscript bar indi-
cates an average of predictions. The first summation of terms on the right hand side can be 
named the Dispersion Error and the second the Common Error, since they measure the total 
quadratic deviation from the mean prediction of the group and the total quadratic deviation of 
this group mean to the market price respectively. Theoretically, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that the Common Error will be very small compared to the Dispersion Error. If there would be a 
sufficient amount of a priori heterogeneity among the group's participants, this would be a logical 
implication of the fact that individuals cannot observe each others' predictions. That is, when 
making the rather strong assumption that the distributions of the participants' predictions 
through time are roughtly centered around the actual market price
24.  
Figure #7 shows the shares of the Common Error and the Dispersion Error in the total sum of 
squared errors, for each of the thirteen groups. Before calculating these shares, in each group 
those time periods were excluded that showed market or prediction price irregularities clearly 
due to incidental outliers in price predictions
25. Including all time periods would have dispropor-
tionately increased the share of the Dispersion Error, since any prediction mistake adds much 
more to the dispersion of price predictions than to the displacement of the prediction mean, on 
                                                           
24 As such, this assumption is identical to Muth's original definition of the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (Muth, 1961, p. 316). In this working paper the Rational Expectations Hypothesis will 
be said to mean that participants can unerringly foresee market price development, excluding 
only the noise interference, as soon as the Phases of Entry have ended. As is demonstrated in the 
mathematical appendix, in the experiment rational individuals would always predict the funda-
mental price, resulting in a Common Error of zero and a Dispersion Error equal to the sum of 
squared noise terms. 
25 The sets of excluded time periods are as follows. For the six Cobweb groups: {44}, {8,...,12}, 
{36,45,...,50}, Ø, {21,41} and {8,...,15,22} respectively. For the seven Asset Pricing groups: Ø, Ø, 
Ø, {39}, {7,...,16,28,34,45}, {15,25,35} and Ø respectively. Figures #1 and #2 can be used to 
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which it has only limited influence. Furthermore, the prediction mistakes in both treatments can 
indeed be regarded as accidents, because during most of the expriment all participants are quite 
able to submit fairly accurate predictions, eliminating the rationale for wild experimentation
26. 
On the whole, Figure #7 shows surprisingly large shares for the Common Error, averaging in 
both treatments over 60% and reaching almost 80% in the Cobweb treatment. The smaller average 
and larger standard deviation of the Common Error shares in the Asset Pricing groups seem to be 
mainly caused by the relatively large Dispersion Error in the third through sixth groups of that 
treatment. Since Asset Pricing groups 5 and 6 were also the ones in the experiment suffering most 
from prediction mistakes and, on the other hand, the untroubled groups 1, 2 and 7 show results in 
Figure #7 that are entirely comparable with those of the Cobweb groups, it is quite possible that, 
despite the exclusion of atypical time periods beforehand, there is still some residual influence of 
the prediction mistakes biasing downward the average share of the Common Error in the Asset 
Pricing treatment. Therefore, aside from the general conclusion that the Common Error's share in 
the total prediction error is significant for both treatments, supporting the existence of blind 
coordination among participants that was already observed in the last section, it can be said that 
the degree of coordination is very high in both treatments, equalling at least 60% on average but 
being more likely to approach 80%, as long as prediction mistakes do not occur
27. 
The significance of the Common Error in both treatments implies the existence of inter-
subject coordination, but, more specifically, it also suggests the presence of certain regularities in 
the way participants tend to pick up changes in the market price. That is to say, a structural 
tendency to either over or underestimate short-term trends in the market price development 
could in theory result in the sort of error decomposition magnitudes witnessed in Figure #7. A 
simple way of gaining some intuition into the kind of prediction rules the participants coordinate 
on is to inspect the degree of overreaction their predictions tend to exhibit relative to market 
price fluctuations. Defining this kind of overreaction as the extent to which the average change, 
from one period to the next, in a participant's expectations is greater than the average change in 
realized prices on that participant's market, Figure #8 shows the degrees of overreaction for all 78 
participants divided over the six Cobweb and zeven Asset Pricing groups. 
Graph (a) gives an indication of the degrees of overreaction based on absolute changes in 
price predictions and market prices. Indeed it shows clear regularities whithin the treatments. 
The group averages of the mean absolute prediction changes, as represented by the grey bars, are 
below the mean absolute market price changes, represented by the black bars, for five out of six 
                                                           
26 In the answers to the questionnaire after the experiment, several participants actually admitted 
to having made prediction mistakes, mostly as a result of typing errors. See Appendix A for 
details. 
27 If the turbulent periods were not excluded, these averages would fall to 45% for the Asset 
Pricing treatment and 55% for the Cobweb treatment, the Asset Pricing treatment's Common 
Error being no longer significantly positive at reasonable significance levels. This dramatic drop 
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Cobweb groups, while they are above them for all seven Asset Pricing groups
28. This result 
suggests that participants in the Asset Pricing treatment have a tendency to overreact to changes 
in the market price, while Cobweb treatment participants instead show a tendency to underreact. 
These conjectures are further supported by the observations that never more than two partici-
pants overreact in any of the six Cobweb groups, that the one case of average overreaction in the 
Cobweb treatment, at group three, is clearly due to an outlier, and that only two participants in 
the entire Asset Pricing treatment underreact, excluding the possibility that the tendency to over-
react in the Asset Pricing treatment is primarily caused by several outlying overreactions. 
It must be noted here that the observed tendencies towards overreaction and underreaction 
in the Asset Pricing and Cobweb treatment respectively are consistent with the notion, which 
after a casual inspection of Figures #1 and #2 seems credible, that participants in the Asset 
Pricing groups generally use simple linear trend-extrapolative prediction rules, while their coun-
terparts in the Cobweb groups rather seem to use some form of adaptive expectations rules. To 
these hypotheses, which will be further investigated in sections 6 and 7 of this working paper, 
Graph (b) of Figure #8 adds an interesting refinement.  
The Graph is identical to Graph (a), except for the fact that it is based on nominal instead of 
absolute changes in price predictions and market prices. A first observation is the closeness of 
the grey and black bars, except for the third Cobweb group which is again disturbed by its 
confused fifth participant, indicating that the underreactions and overreactions occurring in 
Graph (a) are more or less symmetrical with respect to the sign of the change in market prices. 
The market prices themselves, though, do not everywhere follow a balanced movement in the 
time periods considered, as is demonstrated by all but the last of the Asset Pricing groups, again 
ignoring the third Cobweb group. Apparently, market prices and predictions thereof in the Asset 
Pricing treatment generally have a stronger tendency to rise than to fall and they do so in tandem.  
There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, that the specific concep-
tion of the experimental markets, which for the Asset Pricing groups resulted in an initial market 
price of well below the fundamental value, together with the limited total amount of time periods 
produced, for many groups in the Asset Pricing treatment, unrepresentative segments of oscil-
latory price developments that may well have been, if they would have been complete, perfectly 
balanced in their increasing and decreasing parts. Secondly, that there is a specific asymmetry in 
the prediction rules used in the six Asset Pricing groups under consideration that makes 
participants respond differently to market price decreases and increases, in such a way that the 
increases tend to be reinforced more strongly than the decreases, while a discrepancy of any 
significance between the aggregate prediction changes and market price changes is avoided. 
Unfortunately, this working paper lacks the space to further explore these explanations, so they 
will be left as untested hypotheses for future research. 
                                                           
28 The fifth Asset Pricing group's grey bar floating at 64.56 and its black bar at 36.67, both falling 
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6.  Testing the Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
If all the participants of the experiment would have consistently used rational expectations, 
which is to say that all of them in each time period would have predicted correctly the deter-
ministic part of the market price, then, as will be verified in the mathematical appendix, all price 
predictions would equal the fundamental value, leaving only noise as a source of inequality 
between the treatments. However, the experimental results, as shown in the Figures #1 and #2, 
clearly reveal major differences in both price predictions and market prices, suggesting that the 
above hypothesis of universal rationality does not hold. On the other hand, if we restrict attention 
to the groups of the Cobweb treatment only, and delete the Phase of Entry that has been devised 
in the last section, it would be very difficult to discern with the naked eye whether or not certain 
groups fulfill this rationality hypothesis. 
In this section the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) will be tested using several statis-
tics comprised of realised prices
29. The hypothesis itself can be simply formulated as follows: 
() { }
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As usual, p* denotes the fundamental price of 60, σ
2 the noise variance of 1/4 and t* the period 
following termination of the Phase of Entry, equal to 8 in the Cobweb treatment and 4 in the Asset 
Pricing treatment. This probability distribution of the market price will be used to derive the 
distribution of several widely used statistics below. For each group, the realized value of these 
statistics will be confronted with their distributions under the null hypothesis, in order to inves-
tigate the extent to which the above Hypothesis can be considered to hold for this experiment. 
The first statistics to be tested for consistence with the Rational Expectations Hypothesis are, 
of course, the mean and variance. Both of the statistics will be tested for each of the thirteen 
groups, but also the sample range will be varied in each case, to obtain a measure of the robust-
ness of each end result. In total, dozens of tests will be performed on these first two sample 
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29 The REH, which might seem to have no practical significance to begin with, could be expected 
not to provide a reasonable explanation of market price behavior. However, it has been found 
that in both treatments in some sense the market price converges to the fundamental, allowing 
for the possibility that the REH would perform quite well as a long-term price description. 
30 The statistical derivations in this section are well-known and shall not be expounded here. See 
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In these distributions, t** represents the upper boundary of the sample range over which the 
statistics are calculated, and t*, as usual, represents the lower boundary. For each group, t* is 
kept constant at the time period for which the Majority Criterium holds, while t** assumes all 
values between t* and 50 for which the relevant statistic is defined
31.  
Figure #9 shows the qualitative results for all tests on the group mean and variance. The 
significance level was set at 5%. Both graphs show a considerable difference between the two 
treatments, with the seven Asset Pricing groups showing a much higher rejection rate than the six 
Cobweb groups. This was to be expected, since already from Figure #2 it becomes clear that 
market price development in the Asset Pricing treatment is something quite different from a 
white noise process around the fundamental value. Also between the graphs there is some diffe-
rence, since the Cobweb groups are more in accordance with the null hypothesis when tested for 
their mean than for their variance. This is also consistent with the graphs from Figure #1, since 
they show a development closely around the fundamental, but with occasional outliers and 
subsequent volatility that would inflate any statistic measuring the second moment of this 
development. On the whole, for the Asset Pricing treatment, 98.5% and 98.2% of all 329 tests were 
rejected in graphs (a) and (b) respectively, showing clearly the incapability of the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis to describe the first two moments of the market price in this treatment
32. 
For the Cobweb treatment the numbers are much better, though very different, 7.0%  and 61.6% of 
all 258 tests being rejected in graphs (a) and (b) respectively. The REH seems therefore to be a 
rather good explanation of the first moment of price development in the Cobweb model, but not 
such a good one of the second moment
33. 
Another implication of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis is the absence of any auto-
                                                           
31 Ordering the sample ranges in such a way allows for a better evaluation of the validity of the 
null hypothesis, since it is basically being tested at every possible time period, ensuring that rejec-
tions or non-rejections that are unrepresentative of the group results as a whole do not obtain a 
false prominence. 
32 An interesting result is the non-rejection at t**=50 for group 8 in graph (a). If tests would only 
be done for full sample ranges, then it would appear that this group has an average market price 
that is not significantly different from the value predicted by the REH, while for all other ranges 
considered here the reverse statement holds. 
33 Another way of testing for the REH mean and variance is by fixing the upper boundary of the 
sample range and varying the lower boundary. This approach though yields rejection rates that 
are not qualitatively different from the ones above, with 97.9% and 88.2% respectively for the 
Asset Pricing groups, and 19.8% and 44.0% respectively for the Cobweb groups. For completeness, 
tests were also done over the full sample ranges, but excluding the turbulent time periods of 
footnote 25. The results were almost identical to those of the last columns in Figure #9, with only 
the variance test of the sixth Cobweb group being accepted instead of rejected, giving no reason 
to assume that prediction outliers are responsible for the REH's poor relevance. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  17
correlation in market prices. That is, autocorrelation of the k-th order should, under the null 
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The implication describes a way in which the null hypothesis can be tested through the auto-
correlation, at a significance level of 5%. The value of the r statistic in (11) has been calculated for 
each group and for each k up to five. The results are displayed in Figure #10. Again, the difference 
between both treatments is large, with the market prices in the Cobweb groups showing much 
less significance in the autocorrelation statistic than in the Asset Pricing groups. Also, each 
treatment suffers from autocorrelation in the realized prices with a specific sign only, the Asset 
Pricing groups showing only positive and the Cobweb groups only negative autocorrelation. 
These results are generally in line with the group results in Figures #1 and #2, since the Asset 
Pricing groups there revealed a long-term oscillatory movement around the fundamental value, 
suggesting positive autocorrelation with several lags at least, and the Cobweb groups showed a 
strong alternating convergence to the fundamental, suggesting negative autocorrelation with a 
single lag only
34. The sixth column in Figure #10 shows that only two groups in the Cobweb 
treatment, one-third of the total number, is free entirely of market autocorrelation, while none of 
the Asset Pricing groups satisfy this criterium
35. 
If the results of graphs (a) and (b) of Figure #9 and Figure #10 are compared, it can be seen 
that none of the groups in either of the two treatments convincingly statisfies the requirements of 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. In Figure #9, only groups 1 and 4 of the Cobweb treatment 
were candidates, but they were found to have a significant amount of autocorrelation, though in 
both cases the null hypothesis was rejected only marginally for a single order
36. On the other 
hand, the Cobweb groups showed a much greater compliance with the REH than the Asset 
                                                           
34 Moreover, the signs in Figure #10 neatly reproduce the signs of the corresponding feedback 
effects of the market structures, suggesting that participants tend to stick close to the last 
observed market price, so that the market price adaptation has the same sign as the feedback 
effect, ultimately equalizing the signs of the autocorrelation and the feedback. 
35 In more realistic models of asset markets, the Efficient Market Hypothesis would of course 
dispose of any easily predictable linear structure in market prices. Because of the chronological 
rigidity of our Asset Pricing model and the non-strategic risk-averseness of the traders though, the 
Hypothesis cannot be expected to hold here.  
36 It must be said though that comparing results in this sense effectively increases the significance 
level, so a joint non-rejection would indeed require "convincing satisfaction". Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  18
Pricing groups, especially through the mean, but in a smaller fraction of cases also through the 
variance and the autocorrelation. 
7.  Estimation of the individual prediction rules 
The limitations of human cognition aside, it is impossible for the participants in the experi-
ment to explicitly use the Rational Expectations strategy, since they are not given enough infor-
mation beforehand to completely understand the structure of the market. Given this lack of 
information, it is all the more interesting that the market prices do show some compliance with 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, to an extent that cannot be entirely due to chance. On the 
other hand, on the basis of the tests employed in the last section, in the Asset Pricing treatment 
the REH is convincingly rejected. Therefore, to be able to understand the true development of the 
market price in both treatments, it is necessary to construct an alternative hypothesis that better 
incorporates the actual behavior of the participants. 
Instead of assuming that the participants have a sound theoretical understanding of the 
market in which they are active, it is hereafter supposed that they use simple prediction rules, 
based on information of the recent past, for which they need neither theoretical insight nor 
computational skill. The information each individual has, consists of the series of market prices 
of his group up to the last time period, and the series of his past predictions of these prices. 
Assuming that participants can incorporate only a small amount of information in their prediction 
rules, the following specification might offer a reasonable description of these rules: 
11 22 33 1 2 3 ,, 1 , 2 , 3 ε −−− −−− =+ + + + + + +
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In its most general form, the specification uses three former market prices and three predictions 
of them, further containing only a constant c and a noise term ε. The market prices can be seen as 
objective variables and the predictions as subjective ones, which explains the names given to the 
six coefficients. As a whole, the linear specification in (12) will be designated the AdAR(3,3) 
prediction rule, AdAR standing for Adaptive Autoregressive, referring to the subjective and the 
objective parts of the specifation respectively, and the parameters indicate the greatest lag of the 
objective and subjective variables respectively that has been included as an explanatory variable. 
Standard econometric techniques can be used to estimate the coefficients in (12), for all 78 
participants. Ordinary Least Squares yields the results in Tables #2 and #3, for the Cobweb and 
the Asset Pricing treatment respectively. These results have also been depicted in Figure #11. In 
Tables #2 and #3 an encouraging result is that the amount of prediction rules for which auto-
correlation has remained in the residuals is small, that is 7 out of 78, of which 3 originate from the 
fifth Asset Pricing group, which was subject to a wildly destabilizing prediction error. With more 
than 90% of all prediction developments described adequately by the AdAR specification, there is 
little reason to make it more complicated by introducing non-linearity or adding explanatory 
variables. Tables #2 and #3 show also that the R-squared statistic tends to be much larger in the Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  19
Asset Pricing treatment, though in the Cobweb treatment it already seems to achieve reasonably 
high values, given the rather unvolatile price developments in most of its groups
37. Moreover, in 
the Asset Pricing treatment, the constant tends to have a much lower value than in the Cobweb 
treatment, the first lag of the market price tends to have absolutely a higher value, and more 
terms tend to have a coefficient that significantly differs from zero. These results all reflect the 
slow oscillating movement of the market price in the Asset Pricing treatment as opposed to the 
almost stable movement in the Cobweb treatment, in the sense that, in the Asset Pricing groups, 
participants cannot base their prediction rules on a single absolute value, but they can assign a 
high predictive value to the last market price, and in general they will need a more complicated 
rule to capture market price development than their colleagues in the Cobweb groups. 
Figure 11 consists of a graphical representation of the objective and subjective coefficients of 
specification (12). The parameter vectors o and s have been plotted in seperate three-dimensional 
spaces. Additionally, in the so-called objective coefficient space, the results have been plotted of 
an application of (12) to the market prices of the thirteen groups, which amounted to an ordinary 
AR(3) estimation, since the subjective terms were irrelevant in this case
38. The position of the 
open and closed diamonds representing the AR(3) coefficients give an indication how well the 
participants have picked up the statistical regularities in the market price developments. Note 
that the spaces differ in scale, suggesting immediately the asymmetry between objective and 
subjective variables in the participants' prediction rules. 
The distribution of the dots within graphs (a) and (b) demonstrates several interesting 
features. Firstly, it seems as though, in both spaces, a large part of the dots lie on the two-
dimensional level plane, and even stronger, in the subjective space, a majority is confined to one 
of the axis in the plane. It is impossible to verify this hypothesis from Figure #11 alone, but the 
extent to which it is true can easily be inferred by reading Tables #2 and #3. Secondly, in the 
objective coefficient space there are clear signs of clustering among coefficient vectors belonging 
to the same treatment, and between the group diamonds and vectors of the same treatment. In 
the subjective space clustering among coefficient vectors from the same treatment hardly seems 
to be present though. Thirdly, in the objective coefficient space, the vectors of the Cobweb 
treatment have a strong tendency to remain close to the origin, and the great majority of them 
appears to be very close to the positive unit square in the two-dimensional plane. At the same 
time, the coefficient vectors of the Asset Pricing treatment tend to be a bit farther from the origin, 
and almost all of them appear to lie in the unit square that roughly forms an "8" shape with the 
positive unit square. These conjectures taken together suggest that there might be a simple way 
to describe many of the estimated prediction rules, possibly even of both treatments simul-
taneously. An attempt at such a description will be made in the next section. 
                                                           
37 The fact that zero values for the R-squared are associated with prediction rules that cannot be 
distinguished from Rational Expectations and therefore should be excluded if the R-squared is to 
be interpreted as a measure of the quality of estimation, makes this statement even more true. 
38 A numerical version of these results has been contained in Table #4. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  20
The success of the AdAR(3,3) specification in capturing the great majority of the participants' 
prediction rules demonstrates, whatever the true mechanism is generating these rules, that the 
human capacity for expectation formation is severely limited both in memory usage and in the 
construction of an appropriate specification. By far the most of the prediction series in the 
experiment can be statistically described by an additively linear composition of the available 
price information, with a lag depth of at most three. A more exact way to describe the extent to 
which human expectation formation is limited, is to count for each participant with an AdAR rule 
the number of explanatory variables comprising it, using these numbers to calculate averages 
over both treatments. The number of significant variables in a participant's prediction rule is here 
defined to be its Complexity. 
The average Complexities for both of the treatments are depicted in Figure #12. The first pair 
of bars shows that the average Complexity of the Asset Pricing AdAR rules is almost twice as high 
as the average Complexity of the Cobweb AdAR rules. This result seems to reflect the relatively 
non-trivial nature of the market price developments in the Asset Pricing treatment, which the 
predictions tend to follow closely. A more surprising result is obtained by comparing the second 
and third pair of bars with the first. In both pairs the height of the second bar is, like in the first 
pair, approximately twice as large as the height of the first bar. This implies that the number of 
variables participants use in their prediction rules is, on average, distributed over the objective 
and subjective parts of the AdAR specification with proportions that are approximately identical 
for both the Cobweb and the Asset Pricing treatments. Comparing the second and the third pair 
of bars yields a ratio of, again, approximately two to one, in favor of the objective variables.  
Figure #12 produces yet another universal result. If the average Complexities of the market 
price developments, which can be calculated by applying an AdAR(3,0) or AR(3) specification to 
them, are deducted from the average Complexities of the participants' prediction rules, in each 
treatment seperately, then in both cases almost one significant term remains. It can be said, 
therefore, that participants on average overestimate the market price development by a single 
variable, regardless of the treatment they are in. This result has an ironic quality, since with all 
their boundedness and imperfection, participants of both treatments on average behave in a way 
that is clearly more sophisticated than the market as a whole does. 
8.  Shifting Trend Expectations 
The AdAR specification in equation (12), with its six-dimensional parameter space, in princi-
ple captures a multitude of prediction rules. Since the degree of heterogeneity among the partici-
pants is probably quite small though, as was hypothesised in Section 3 regarding the blind 
coordination among price predictions, it might be possible to put a number of restrictions on the 
AdAR coefficients, resulting in a more specific description of individual expectation formation, 
while keeping the number of rules failing to satisfy these restrictions to a minimum.  
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higher lags from the specification in (12). In the last section it was already shown that the third 
lag of the market prices is relatively little used across both treatments, while participants at the 
same time tend to use only one of the first two lags of their price predictions, mostly ignoring the 
third prediction lag. These statements can be clarified by classifying the estimated prediction 
rules according to their highest lags in objective and subjective variables, counting the number of 
rules in each category and then putting them in decreasing order.  
Figure #13 shows the results of such a procedure. The first two bars show the great applica-
bility of the AdAR specification to real world prediction rules. The twelve bars to the right of the 
first pair show lag depth for all 71 estimated prediction rules, resulting in the exclusion of the 
combinations (0,1) and (0,2), since they never occurred. Reading the Figure from left to right, the 
sum of the lag depths tends to increase, showing that the complexity of a prediction rule is 
roughly inversely related to its popularity among participants. Also, the Figure confirms that pre-
diction rules with a high subjective lag depth have little weight in both treatments. This becomes 
clear especially when inspecting the third through seventh bars, ending with (2,1). Only one of 
these four bars has a positive subjective lag depth, which is no greater than one, while the four of 
them account for roughly 62% of all prediction rules. Lastly, the domination of Cobweb predic-
tion rules in low lag depths like (1,0) and (0,0), and the domination of Asset Pricing rules in 
higher ones like (2,1), (3,0), and (1,3) reflects the asymmetry between the treatments, the Asset 
Pricing participants having in general more complex prediction rules than the Cobweb 
participants. 
If it's mainly prediction rules with short lag depths that participants choose to use, favoring 
past market prices over their own past predictions, then there are several well-known rules that 
might describe a large proportion of the participants' rules, while being themselves specific forms 
of the AdAR specification in (12). Figure #14 shows the results of the application of five canonical 
prediction rules to the 71 succesful AdAR estimations
39. The third through seventh bar indicate 
their weight in the population of participants, divided into the two treatments
40. All of the cano-
nical rules have some support in both treatments, but none of them seems particularly represen-
tative, the most succesful one being AR(2), describing almost 17% of the estimated rules. To 
improve on this result, it is necessary to construct a new prediction rule that captures much more 
of the participants' behavior, while still offering a more specific explanation of individual 
expectation formation than the general AdAR specification does. 
                                                           
39 The exact way in which the prediction rules of Figure #17 are distributed over the seperate 
groups is listed in Table #5. 
40 To make sure the labels are well understood, "AR(1)" and "AR(2)" denote autoregressive rules of 
the order one and two exactly, that is, they are here considered to be mutually exclusive; "Naive" 
denotes the first-order autoregressive rule with a coefficient of one, "Fundamental" the constant 
prediction rule at 60 and "Adaptive" an average between the first lag of the market price and the 
first lag of the price prediction. The autoregressive rules have been tested by simply checking the 
entries in Tables #2 and #3 for the required pattern, while the other ones were verified by appro-
priate joint Wald parameter restrictions tests, at 5% significance level (see Greene, 1997 / 1993, pp. 
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The last bar in Figure #14 shows that such a rule exists. The so-called Shifting Trend rule 
accurately describes 40 of the AdAR estimations, which is over 56%, or approximately 51% of all 
78 participants. Moreover, its representation is divided almost equally over both treatments, 
suggesting that it has some robustness to changes in market structure. The success of the Shifting 
Trend rule undoubtedly is partly due to the fact that it can be seen as a specific composition of 
the five canonical rules in Figure #14. Enough restrictions apply to this composition though to 
make it a close description of the actual thought process of a majority of participants. 




11 2 1 2 1 2 ,, 1 1 α αα α β ε −− − − =+ + − −+ − + t
ee
tt t ht ht ppp pp p   (13)
 
In this recursive equation, as usual, p
* denotes the fundamental price of 60 and ε is a series of 
identically and independently distributed random numbers with an average of zero. The equation 
has four coefficients and three parameters, so can be described as STE(α1,α2,β). For the main 
part, it consists of an average over three variables that are in general most likely to approximate 
the market price of the next time period, under the assumption that participants consider only 
simple variables as predictors and ignore candidates that were manifested more than one period 
ago
41. Since this choice restriction necessarily produces crude price estimates, it is further 
assumed that participants compensate for short-term fluctuations, again in a most simple way, by 
adding a market price difference term to their prediction rule with a certain weight, which might 
very well be negative. The rule as a whole is given its name, since it requires the addition of the 
estimated trend in the market price development and a longer term estimate of the market price 
level, thereby constantly shifting the base from which an imaginary trend line, which itself will be 
rotating from period to period, is extended. 
Figure #15 depicts the 40 confirmed Shifting Trend Expectations rules in an intuitive geo-
metric form
42. The parameter choices granted by the first three variables in the Shifting Trend 
specification are represented by the simplex in the two-dimensional plane and the weight 
attached to the first-order estimate of the market price trend is incorporated by extending the 
simplex into the third dimension. The geometric shape resulting is that of a prism, which in the 
Figure has been cut off by the hyperplanes at an absolute height of one. In its level plane, the 
prism contains a mixture of the three most obvious price predictions of the zeroth order, while 
any parameter vector either above or below the level plane is associated with a Shifting Trend 
rule that uses a first-order estimate of the market price trend. The prism as a whole can therefore 
                                                           
41 What is left implicit in this equation, is the way in which participants derive the fundamental 
price, in the case they assign a positive coefficient to it. In principle they could use a complicated 
function of former prices and predictions to estimate it, but it will be seen that only the Cobweb 
participants generally use the fundamental value in their STE rules, and in none of the Cobweb 
groups long memory or heavy computation is required to infer the fundamental value. 
42 The exact values of the parameters describing these rules are listed in Table #6, along with the 
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be referred to as the Prism of First-Order Heuristics. 
Within the Prism, the estimated parameter vectors clearly show clustering among vectors 
coming from the same treatment. The 19 Cobweb vectors, often lying so close together that they 
cannot be distinguished, are mostly positioned along the α1-axis, implying that most of the 
participants having a Shifting Trend rule in the Cobweb treatment use only an average of the last 
market price and the fundamental value to predict future prices. Composing the labels in Figure 
#15, these individuals can be designated as "naive fundamentalists"
43, though it must be said that 
some of them have parameter vectors so close to, or even on, the vertices of the simplex that they 
might as well have been described as "naive" or "fundamentalist"
44.  
The 21 Asset Pricing vectors also tend to be positioned in a specific part of the Prism's boun-
dary, only this part seems to consist of two seperate areas, namely the ones surrounding the 
vertical lines connecting the points (1,0,0) and (1,0,1), and (1/2,1/2,0) and (1/2,1/2,1) respecti-
vely
45. The majority of the parameter vectors is concentrated above (1,0,0), which means their 
owners use last period's market price as a base for constructing their predictions, extending from 
this base a trend line with a positive fraction of the angle following from the two last market 
prices. These individuals can therefore roughly be designated as "naive trend followers". The 
remaining Asset Pricing parameter vectors, hovering approximately over (1/2, 1/2,0), are asso-
ciated with prediction rules that are slightly more complicated, since they use an average of the 
last period's market price and their prediction of it as a base for calculating predictions, instead 
of just the market price. These individuals as a whole have the most sophisticated Shifting Trend 
rules in the experiment, and can be labelled as "adaptive trend followers". 
To what extent the estimated Shifting Trend Expectations rules, which, as reported above,  
describe 56% of the succesfully estimated AdAR rules or 51% of all individual expectations series, 
are representative for the way in which individuals form expectations in general can be roughly 
inferred from the ability of the estimated rules to recreate market price developments similar to 
those obtained from the experiment. For this purpose, two artificial groups of expectations rules 
were created, consisting, respectively, of the 19 STE rules derived from participants of the 
Cobweb treatment and the 21 STE rules from Asset Pricing treatment participants. Using 
                                                           
43 In the Figure, "obstinacy" refers to the prediction rule that consists only of the last price predic-
tion, while "trend following" and "trend reversing" refer to all prediction rules that assign a weight 
of 1 and -1 respectively to the difference term β in the specification (13). The other labels are 
explained in footnote 40.  
44 Based on the appropriate Wald parameter restrictions tests at 5% significance level, 14 out of 19 
Cobweb coefficient vectors can be said not to deviate significantly from the α1-axis, while 9 out of 
these 14 are close to the origin and 5 to (1,0,0). Four vectors though are "close" to both the origin 
and the opposing vertex, reflecting the small difference in general between the fundamental value 
and the market price in the Cobweb treatment groups. The exact results are shown in Table #6. 
45 Again applying appropriate Wald parameter restrictions tests at 5% significance level, 10 out of 
21 Asset Pricing coefficient vectors are found not to deviate significantly from the vertical line 
through (1,0,0) and 8 from the vertical line through (1/2,1/2,0). In two cases, a vector is "close" 
to both these lines. See Table #6 for details. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  24
different values for the average initial price prediction and assuming that all artificial members of 
both groups naively predict the market price in the second period, series of market prices with a 
length of 50 have been generated that can be compared with those of the experiment. Moreover, 
to investigate the way in which participants in the experiment had adapted their prediction rules 
to the treatment they were in, the two groups of STE rules were also applied to the model 
opposite to the one they were originally derived from. 
Figure #16 shows the results of the four constructed cases. In Graphs (a) and (b), the STE 
rules have been applied to their original feedback systems, that is, the Cobweb model and the 
Asset Pricing model respectively. The market price developments shown, of which the one with 
the intermediate initial value deserves the most attention, are in important respects similar to the 
experimental ones, as shown in Figures #1 and #2. Like in the experiment, the market prices in 
the Cobweb model are very volatile for a few periods, but then quickly and permanently converge 
to the fundamental value. Likewise, market prices in the Asset Pricing model show much less 
initial volatility, but also take a much longer time to converge, which they do so less convincingly 
than in the Cobweb model. Actually, aside from the greater smoothness of the market price series 
in Graphs (a) and (b), which is likely to be due to the absence of prediction anomalies and the 
greater number of artificial group members, the only qualitative difference with the experimental 
data seems to be the absence of oscillatory movement around the fundamental price in the Asset 
Pricing model. However, this discrepancy can probably also for a large part be ascribed to the 
absence of prediction mistakes, which are well-known to influence price development in the 
Asset Pricing model much more than in the Cobweb model, creating the possibility of transfor-
ming exponential convergence into dampening oscillation
46. Lastly, it must be noted that, if indeed 
the simulated price series are representative for the experimental developments stripped of 
prediction outliers, they lend strong support for the hypothesis that market prices in both models 
will, in the long term, converge to the fundamental value, as required by the Rational Expec-
tations Hypothesis. 
The fact that participants in the two treatments have been found to use in general quite diffe-
rent prediction rules, as is reflected in the within treatment clustering inside the Prism of Figure 
#15, shows that individuals choose the prediction rule they apply to match in some way the 
environment they are in. To be able to judge in what way the expectation formation of the indiv-
idual adapts itself to the two treatments of the experiment, it might be insightful to subject the 
groups of STE rules to the treatments opposite to their original ones. The results are shown in 
Graph (c), generated by the Asset Pricing rules in the Cobweb model, and in Graph (d), generated 
by the Cobweb rules in the Asset Pricing model. The simulated market price series in Graph (c) 
are all strongly divergent, as was to be expected, since among the STE rules from the Asset 
Pricing treatment are many trend-following ones that by themselves cause alternating price 
                                                           
46 Clear examples of such a transformation occur in Graph (f) of Figure #2 at time periods 15 and 
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movements of increasing amplitude when applied to a negative feedback system such as the 
Cobweb model. Therefore, it may be said that the participants in the Cobweb treatment, again 
assuming that the 19 STE rules are a sufficient representation, have adapted to their environment, 
in the sense that their "naive fundamentalist" rules clearly perform far superior to the trend-
following alternative.  
More surprising are the price series of Graph (d). They are slightly similar to the series of 
Graph (b), only show a much faster and closer convergence to the fundamental price. Undoubt-
edly, this paradoxical succes can be explained by the fact that many of the STE rules from the 
Cobweb treatment contain a large component equal to the fundamental price, which the partici-
pants in the Cobweb groups had plenty of opportunity to learn in the course of the experiment. 
The value of such knowledge is clearly illustrated by comparison of Graphs (b) and (d) and it 
would be unfair to conclude that the participants of the Asset Pricing treatment have poorly 
chosen their prediction rules, since they could have only reasonably learned the fundamental 
price some time into the experiment. 
9. Conclusion 
When individuals are placed in artificial economies that are purely expectations-driven, in the 
sense that supply and demand functions are fixed and trade is therefore automatic, major diffe-
rences can arise in the development of market prices, even when traditional economic theory 
would predict there to be no difference whatsoever. This anomaly implies that humans, instead of 
being fully rational, use some kind of bounded rationality to form price expectations, which, as is 
evident in the experimental results, they may vary according to the economic environment they 
are confronted with. However, the ability of individuals to choose an appropriate form of boun-
ded rationality is likely to be limited, since in the experiment it is shown that most participants, 
whatever the shape of their economy, choose their prediction rule from a highly restricted and 
simple set of rules. 
The two treatments of the experiment have produced series of market prices with clear 
qualitative differences. In the Cobweb groups, prices tend to go through an initial phase of high 
volatility, neatly converging afterwards to the fundamental price, only to be disturbed occasio-
nally by the impact of a mistake by one of the group members. In the Asset Pricing groups, 
volatility in the beginning lasts for a much shorter period, but also is not followed by a quick 
convergence to the fundamental price. Rather, most groups demonstrate a slow oscillatory 
movement around the fundamental value, which seems to come very close to it only in the long 
run. A short and general way of describing the market price development in the Cobweb 
treatment is therefore "slow coordination and fast convergence", and in the Asset Pricing 
treatment "fast coordination and slow convergence". These labels are at odds with the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis in this context, which requires market prices to be a white noise 
process around the fundamental value. In the long run, though, it might be expected that prices in Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  26
both treatments would be sufficiently close to the fundamental value to resemble the REH 
process, though some excess volatility would undoubtedly remain. 
A surprising characteristic of the price predictions, from participants of both treatments, is 
their closeness to each other, resulting in small differences in earnings within groups, as compa-
red to significant deviations in aggregate earnings between them. This coordination of price pre-
dictions is surprising, since participants were not able to observe each others' predictions during 
the experiment, making the coordination itself "blind", or so to speak. In accordance with this 
phenomenon, it was found that participants in the Asset Pricing treatment tended to overreact in 
their predictions to market price changes, while Cobweb treatment participants tended to 
underreact. The only way to explain the blind coordination is by assuming a high degree of 
homogeneity in human expectation formation within the economic contexts simulated by the 
experiment. In general, expectation formation might therefore be conjectured to consist of the 
selection of prediction rules, appropriate to certain environments, from a set of previously 
embedded rules that is both limited in complexity and virtually ubiquitous as a component of 
human bounded rationality. 
Perhaps the most important objective of the experiment has been to derive explicitly the 
prediction rules actually used by the participants in both treatments. For the great majority of 
them, a mathematical description has indeed been found, by using the linear Adaptive Auto-
regressive specification. These descriptions then point towards yet another specification, simpler 
and more easily interpretable than the family of AdAR rules. This is the Shifting Trend Expec-
tations rule, composed of several of the most basic prediction rules already known. A majority of 
AdAR rules, almost equally distributed among both treatments, has proven to be statistically 
equivalent to an STE rule with suitable parameters. By depicting these parameters in a geometric 
figure shaped as a prism, a general way of distinguishing between participants from different 
treatments immediately suggested itself. Cobweb treatment participants were best described as 
"naive fundamentalists", while Asset Pricing treatment participants could be called either "naive 
trend followers" of "adaptive trend followers". To verify the extent to which the STE rules are 
representative for all the participants' predictions, they were grouped by treatment and used in a 
simulation attempting to recreate qualitatively the experimental results. For both treatments 
there appears to be a close similarity between theory and practice. Surprisingly, an application of 
the Cobweb STE rules in the Asset Pricing model improved the speed and the extent of the con-
vergence to the fundamental value, indicating the importance of information on fundamentals for 
the stability properties of positive feedback systems, e.g. markets for financial assets. 
Finally, looking back at Henk van de Velden's thesis (2001), which directly precedes the 
present research as mentioned in the introduction, an important difference should be noted 
concerning the existence of bubble-like developments in the market price. In Van de Velden's so-
called NoRobot Asset Pricing treatment, which is the equivalent of the present Asset Pricing treat-
ment, realized prices exhibited explosive movements in five out of six groups, which were restric-Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  27
ted only by imposing an artificial price ceiling (pp. 127-9). In none of our seven Asset Pricing 
groups, though, a sustained inflating movement in the market prices has been witnessed (see 
Figure #2). Van de Velden's explanation for his "endogenously speculative bubbles" was that 
"participants try to extrapolate trends" (p. 132), that is, trends in realized prices
47.  
This statement suggests the existence of an interesting limitation in human prediction capa-
bilities. Apparently, participants in a single-market economy that has positive expectations feed-
back and is stable under naive expectations tend to produce a slowly converging oscillatory 
movement in the relevant price when they predict one period ahead, while increasing the predic-
tion horizon with a single time period generally results in diverging price developments that do 
not seem to end themselves endogenously. This sensitivity of the qualitative results for small 
changes in prediction horizon implies that the participants' prediction rules are mainly useful in 
the extremely short term and quickly become counter-productive in the absence of relevant infor-
mation directly preceding the price to be forecasted. Specifically, this sensitivity undermines the 
explanatory value of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, which does not allow for any change 
in market price development due to shifts  in prediction horizon. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Protocol 
The experiment was carried out on tuesday the 18th and wednesday the 19th of February 
2003, at the CREED laboratory inside the economics faculty of the University of Amsterdam
1. The 
organizers of the experiment, Peter Heemeijer (MSc), Joep Sonnemans (PhD), Jan Tuinstra (PhD) 
and Cars Hommes (PhD), are all members of the CeNDEF research insitute, while Joep Sonne-
mans is also a member of CREED
2. On the 18th of February Sessions #1 and #2 were successively 
performed, each with 18 participants, making up the Cobweb treatment of the experiment. On the 
19th of February Sessions #3 and #4 were successively performed, the first with 18 participants 
and the second with 24, making up the Asset Pricing treatment. At the beginning of each session, 
excess participants were given 5 euros as a show-up reward and excluded from the experiment. 
These participants were selected first on a voluntary basis and then at random. 
During each of the sessions, when the excess participants had left, a short welcoming 
message was read aloud from paper, after which the participants were randomly assigned to a 
cubicle in the computer lab. In each cubicle there was a computer, some experimental instruc-
tions on paper and some blank paper with a pen. The two treatments had different instructions. 
When all the participants were seated, they were asked to read the instructions on their desks. 
After a few minutes, they were given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the instructions, 
after which the experiment started. When the 50 time periods were completed, the participants 
were asked to remain seated and fill in the questionnaire, which was subsequently handed out to 
them. After a reasonable amount of time, the participants were called to the ante-room one by 
one to hand in the questionnaire and receive their earnings, in cash. The participants left the 
computer lab after receiving their earnings. 
The experimental instructions the participants read in their cubicles consisted of three parts, 
totalling five pages. The first part contained general information about the market the experiment 
was about to simulate, which was of course treatment-specific. The second part contained an 
explanation of the computer program used during the experiment. The third part displayed a 
table relating the absolute prediction error made in any single period to the amount of credits 
earned in that period. The conversion rate between credits and euros, being 2600 credits to 1 
euro, was made public by announcement, since it was not listed with the table. The questionnaire 
after the experiment contained 19 questions, the first 10 of which could be answered only by the 
integers 1 through 5. The experimental instructions and the questionnaire are attached to this 
appendix and will be translated respectively below. 
                                                           
1 CREED Is an abbreviation for Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political 
Decision-making. The economics faculty of the University of Amsterdam is located at Roeters-
straat 11, the computer lab is in room B515. 
2 CeNDEF Meaning Center for Non-Linear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. It is part of the 
department of Quantitative Economics and Cars Hommes is its director. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  30
  Translation of "CW, Experimentele instructies" 
CW [short for Cobweb treatment] 
Experimental instructions 
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will 
be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside 
of this sheet of paper. 
General information 
You are an advisor of an importer who is active on a market for a certain product. In each 
time period the importer needs a good prediction of the price of the product. Furthermore, the 
price should be predicted one period ahead, since importing the good takes some time. As the 
advisor of the importer you will predict the price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time 
periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. 
The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings. 
About the market 
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. The size of 
demand is dependent on the price. If the price goes up, demand will go down. The supply on the 
market is determined by the importers of the product. Higher price predictions make an importer 
import a higher quantity, increasing supply. There are several large importers active on this 
market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. Total supply is largely 
determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these importers. Besides the large importers, 
a number of small importers is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply. 
About the price 
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will 
rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall. 
About predicting the price 
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each 
time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative 
and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 
2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the 
beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, V(1). When all 
participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price P(1) for this 
period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) - V(1), your earnings in 
the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 
2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market 
price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 
50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period t consists of: All 
market prices up to time period t-1: {P(t-1), P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time 
period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your total earnings at time period t-1. Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  31
About the earnings 
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the 
price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible 
earnings. 
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the com-
puter instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well. 
  Translation of "AP, Experimentele instructies"  
AP [short for Asset Pricing treatment] 
Experimental instructions 
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will 
be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside 
of this sheet of paper. 
General information 
You are an advisor of a trader who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time 
period the trader needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, intending to sell 
them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the trader requires a good prediction of 
the market price in the next time period. As the advisor of the trader you will predict the price 
P(t) of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the experiment will 
depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your 
earnings. 
About the market 
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply and 
demand on the market are determined by the traders of the product. Higher price predictions 
make a trader demand a higher quantity. A high price prediction makes the trader willing to buy 
the product, a low price prediction makes him willing to sell it. There are several large traders 
active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. Total 
supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies and demands of these traders. 
Besides the large traders, a number of small traders is active on the market, creating small 
fluctuations in total supply and demand. 
About the price 
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will 
rise. Conversely, of total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall. 
About predicting the price 
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each 
time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative 
and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 
2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  32
beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, V(1). When all 
participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price P(1) for this 
period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) - V(1), your earnings in 
the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 
2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market 
price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 
50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period t consists of: All 
market prices up to time period t-1: {P(t-1), P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time 
period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your total earnings at time period t-1. 
About the earnings 
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the 
price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible 
earnings. 
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the com-
puter instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well. 
  Translation of "Computerinstructies" 
Computer instructions 
The way the computer program works that will be used in the experiment, is explained in the 
text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of 
paper. 
The mouse does not work in this program. 
Your earnings in the experiment depend on the accuracy of your predictions. A smaller 
prediction error in each period will result in higher earnings. 
To enter your prediction you can use the numbers, the point and, if necessary, the backspace 
key on the keyboard.  
Your prediction can have two decimal numbers, for example 30.75. Pay attention not to enter 
a comma instead of a point. Never use the comma. Press enter if you have made your choice. 
The better your prediction, the more credits you will earn. On your desk is a table listing your 
earnings for all possible prediction errors. 
For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price turned out to be 12.13. This 
means that the prediction error is: 13.42 – 12.13 ≈ 1.30. The table then says your earnings are 1255 
credits (as listed in the third column [this is a typing error, it should be second column]).  
The available information for predicting the price of the product in period t consists of: All 
product prices from the past up to period t -1; Your predictions up to period t-1; Your earnings 
until then. 
[the caption of the figure] The computer screen. The instructions below refer to this figure. 
In the upper left corner a graph will be displayed consisting of your predictions and of the Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  33
true prices in each period. This graph will be updated at the end of each period.  
In the rectangle in the middle left you will see information about the number of credits you 
have earned in the last period and the number you have earned in total. The time period is also 
displayed here, possibly along with other relevant information. 
On the right hand side of the screen the experimental results will be displayed, that is, your 
predictions and the true prices for at most the last 20 periods. 
At the moment of submitting your price prediction, the rectangle in the lower left side of the 
figure will appear. When all participants have subsequently submitted their predictions, the 
results for the next period will be calculated. 
When everyone is ready reading the instructions, we will begin the experiment. If you have 
questions now or during the experiment, raise your hand. Someone will come to you for assis-
tance. 
  Translation of "Uitbetalingstabel" 
Earnings table 
[title of the first, third and fifth columns] error 
[title of the second, fourth and sixth columns] credits 
[at the bottom of the sixth column] For a prediction error of 7 or larger no credits are earned. 
  Translation of "Vragenlijst over het experiment" 
Questionnaire about the experiment 
Before you collect your earnings, we would like to ask you a few qustions regarding the 
experiment. Answering the questionnaire will take several minutes. The answers will be treated 
completely anonymously. 
1. Multiple  choice  questions 
Below mark only one of the possible answers. The answer "1" means "I totally disapprove", 
the answer "5" means "I totally approve" and the other answers fit in naturally between these two 
extremes. 
1.  "My objective during the experiment was to earn as much money as possible." 
2.  "I think I have earned well." 
3.  "I  constantly have thought for some time about the predictions I submitted." 
4.  "Often I could predict accurately what the price would be." 
5.  "As time passed during the experiment, I started to understand the market better." 
6.  "It was interesting to take part in this experiment." 
7.  "The instructions prior to the experiment were clear to me." 
8.  "The computer program was suitable for this experiment." 
9.  "During the experiment, I had a good idea about the kind of market that was being 
simulated." Forming Price Expectations in Pos. and Neg. Feedback Systems  34
10.  "I have used insights of economic theory to form my predictions." 
2. Open  questions 
Write your answers to the following questions out in full. 
1.  "During the experiment, have you consciously used a specific prediction rule? If so, 
which one was it?" 
2.  "If you would take part in the experiment once again, would you take different decisions? 
If so, how?" 
3.  "When forming your prediction, did you primarily look at the graph, at the left of the 
screen, or at the table, at the right? Why?" 
4.  "Do you have suggestions for improving this kind of experiments?" 
3. Questions  about  yourself 
The following questions will be, as the rest of the questions, treated completely anonymously. 
1.  "What is your age and gender?" 
2.  "What are you studying and in what year are you?" 
3.  "Are you religious, and if so, what is your religion?" 
4.  "What is your cultural background?" 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Mathematical Statements 
Several technical results used in the analysis of the experiment will be explicitly stated and  
proved below. Subjects will be treated according to their order of appearance in the main text, 
starting the paragraph headings with their first place of reference in it. 
  Section 2, page 3: The linearity of the supply function in the 
Cobweb model 
The expected profit of a producer in the Cobweb model on an amount of products q that he 
will sell at period t is, based on the price prediction ph,t
e that he has obtained from participant h, 
equal to ph,t
e q – c(q), with the costs of production equalling c(q). Profit maximization by the pro-
ducer would then require the produced amount to satisfy the first-order condition: 
1








ht ht pc qq c p
qq
  (B1)
   
Suppose now that the producers have identical quadratic production costs, meaning c(q)=aq
2 
with a positive constant a. Then the derivative of the production cost function simply equals 2aq, 
and the inverse of the derivative evaluated at the price prediction becomes ph,t
e / 2a. This is a 
linearly increasing function in the price prediction. It is also the supply function, since for 
quadratic production costs the expected profit function has only one optimum, which is a 
maximum, so the first-order condition generates only profit maximizing quantities. 
  Section 2, page 3: The equivalence of the Cobweb model with 
the traditional equilibrium version 
The equilibrium version of the Cobweb model derives its name from the straightforward price 
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Equation (3) in the main text can be seen to be a specific case of this formula, with specific 
choices for the demand and supply function. This becomes clear immediately after rewriting it 
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The left part of the equation is a linearly decreasing function of the current price, suitable as a 
demand function in the Cobweb model, while the right part consists of a sum of linearly 




Thus, the market maker version of the Cobweb model used in the experiment is actually 
equivalent to a specific form of the equilibrium version, using slightly different demand and 
supply functions. 
  Section 2, page 4: Derivation of the demand function in the 
Asset Pricing model using mean-variance optimization 
Suppose that traders in the Asset Pricing model divide their total wealth W between two 
kinds of financial assets, one with a risk-free rate of return of r and the other with a variable price 
pt and dividend yt. Trader h needs a prediction ph,t + 1
e of the risky asset's price in the next period to 
be able to determine the amount zh,t he should buy to maximize his future wealth Wh,t +1. The rest 
of his current wealth he invests in the risk-free asset, giving the following wealth development: 
() 1 ,1 , ,1 , (1 ) (1 ) + ++ =+ + + −+
e
t t ht ht ht ht Wr W p y r p z (B6)
   
Assuming that the prediction ph,t +1
e is provided by an advisor of the trader, the part played by the 
participants in the experiment, and that the current price of the risky asset is known when the 
traders decide on their demand quantities, the only source of uncertainty in tomorrow's wealth is 
the size of the dividend yt+1. To determine the optimal quantities traders will choose in each pe-
riod, assumptions are required about their subjective beliefs on the probability distribution of the 
dividend, and on their attitudes towards risk. Common choices in this respect are to suppose that 
all traders believe the dividend to be normally distributed with a positive mean and variance σ
2, 
while at the same time all of them share a constant absolute risk aversion with intensity 
parameter a towards the size of their own wealth, that is, U(W) = -e
-aW. Accepting these choices 
and, furthermore, assuming the Expected Utility Hypothesis to hold, the optimization problem of 
the traders can be described as follows: 
()
() 1 ,, , 1
,1
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Defining the excess returns, the quantity between brackets being multiplied by –azh,t
 , to be equal 
to Xt+1, and recognizing that the first term in the exponent of the second equality does not contain 
















































































   
The exchange of the integral and derivative signs in the last equivalence is not trivial, but rather a 
consequence of the continuity of the integrand in the second equation of (B8) in both Xt+1 and zh,t 
and the convergence of the integrand to zero for diverging values of Xt+1
1. It is now possible to 
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The optimal quantity is chosen is such a way to make the left part of the first equation have the 
form of a constant times the expectation of a normally distributed random number with a mean 
of zero, thus equalling it to zero as required. 
  Section 2, page 5: Derivation of the fundamental price in the 
Cobweb model and the Asset Pricing model 
Assuming that participants are able to perfectly predict the non-stochastic component of the 
market price, as required by the Rational Expectations Hypothesis applied to the behavior of the 
individual, the predicted price satisfies the identity ph,t
e = Et-1(pt), that is, equals the expectation of 
the market price lacking knowledge only of the size of the noise term at time t. Substituting in this 
way for the predictions of all participants, which is possible due to the homogeneity of individual 
behavior under the REH, it becomes clear what series of market prices, in both treatments, can 
be designated as "fundamental". 
Fortunately, the nullification of the state variable feedback in both treatments simplifies 
calculations. In the Cobweb model, as described in its most explicit form by equation (3) in the 
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A similar procedure can be applied to equation (6) for the Asset Pricing model: 
                                                           
1 To see this, apply Theorem 4.2 in Whittaker & Watson (1902 / 2003, p. 67) repetitively, with diver-
































If all participants in an experimental group would have behaved in accordance with the REH, 
they would have constantly predicted a price of 60 and the true price would have described a 
white noise process around this price, irrespective of the treatment the group was a part of. 
Moreover, in the experiment rational participants could not have acted differently, for example 
following a speculative bubble development in the Asset Pricing treatment. It will be shown 
below that the absence of non-constant fundamental price developments is actually a peculiarity 
arising from the specific choice of the model parameters in the experiment.  
  Section 3, page 7: The absence of fundamental bubble 
solutions in the Asset Pricing model 
Rewriting the Asset Pricing model's pricing formula, equation (4) in the main text, gives: 
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(B10)
   
Suppose now that the H advisors of the traders in the market are rational, in the sense that they 
are able to foresee the exact deterministic part of the following market price, and that their 
prediction rule consists only of a constant b0 and the last known market price multiplied by a 
factor  b1. Substituting for these assumptions in the above equation, the following parameter 
restiction is generated: 














ry a z bb p p bb p
aa














  ⇔+ +  
 




b0 And b1 are assumed to be constants, so the above equation implies a pair of expressions for 
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The uniqueness in the experiment of the fundamental value as a series of fundamental prices 
can now easily be explained. Calculating b0 and b1 using the experimental parameters gives 60 and 
0 respectively, consistent with the derivation of the fundamental price in the Asset Pricing model 
earlier in this appendix. When a variation of the market maker's adjustment speed λ is considered 
though, it becomes clear that a constant fundamental price is a rather singular phenomenon 
relative to a substantive area of the parameter space. 
When the adjustment speed is decreased to a smaller positive quantity than given by the ratio 
aσ
2/(1+r), b0 decreases to 0 and b1 rises to 1. Therefore, in this open interval of cases with λ=0 as 
its left-hand limit, since b1 lies between 0 and 1, the fundamental market price converges in expec-
tation but is in general not constant. Since it converges in expectation, its non-stochastic parts do 
not change anymore in the limit, creating equivalence, again in expectation, with the situation of 
the calculation (B5) above. Therefore, all positive lambdas smaller than aσ
2/(1+r),  ceteris 
paribus, in general generate a stochastic fluctuation around the fundamental value as a funda-
mental price series only in the long term. 
Three intervals of λ values are interesting to consider here, in a similar way as the one above, 
since they each produce different qualitative features in fundamental price development. In each 
case it is the value of b1 that determines the convergence properties of the fundamental series. 
For λ between aσ
2/(1+r) and 2aσ
2/(2+r), b0 is greater than 60 and b1 lies between 0 and 1. The 
fundamental price therefore alternatingly converges in expectation to the fundamental value. For 
λ between 2aσ
2/(2+r) and aσ
2, b0 is far greater than 60 and b1 is smaller than –1. The fundamental 
price therefore alternatingly diverges in expectation from the fundamental value. That is, as far as 
possible, since the price of course cannot become negative. Finally, for λ greater than aσ
2, b0 is 
negative and b1 is greater than 1. The fundamental price therefore monotonically diverges in 
expectation, creating a speculative bubble solution if the initial price is larger than 60. 
An interesting question for further research would be whether the absence of speculative 
bubbles in the experiment is caused by the absence of a fundamental bubble solution, or by an 
irrational bias in the participants' prediction behavior towards a relatively stable development 
around equilibrium. This question could be answered by repeating the experiment with a λ value 
for which a fundamental bubble solution would exist and observing whether the participants 
would still refrain from following it. A convenient value for λ for example would be 2aσ
2=2,  
implying values for b0 and b1 of -2(y-aσ
2z
s)=-6 an d 1+2r=1.10 respectively. It is important to 
note that setting a different λ would also resurrect the state variable feedback, necessitating an 
initial condition for the market price and a slight complication in the probability distribution of 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure #4: Decomposition of the Phases of Entry for both treatments. Graph (a) and (b) show the first of 
the Cobweb groups and the Asset Pricing groups respectively, enlargements of graphs (a) of Figures #1 and 
#2 respectively.  
 
Figure #5: Calculating the length of the Phases of Entry, for the Cobweb treatment in graph (a) and the 
Asset Pricing treatment in graph (b). The graphs show the number of participants with a prediction error of 
less than five percent of the market price. Thin lines in shades of grey denote the results for individual 
groups and thick lines connect the average numbers per treatment. The Majority Criterium is reached at the 
dashed lines.   
 
Figure #6: Number of participants with a prediction deviating less than five percent from the fundamental 
price. Graph (a) represents the Cobweb treatment and graph (b) the Asset Pricing treatment. Thin lines in 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure #8: Degrees of overreaction, for each participant and for each group as a whole. Graph (a) is based 
on mean absolute changes in price predictions and market prices, while Graph (b) is based on mean nomi-
nal changes. Dots represent mean changes in predictions for individual participants, grey bars the group 
averages over the individual results and black bars the mean changes in market prices. The numbers below 
the ceiling of the Graphs give the location of outlying dots, with the group number of the associated 
participant between brackets. "CM" and "APM" stand for Cobweb Model and Asset Pricing Model.  
 
Figure #9: Testing the Rational Expectations Hypothesis for the group mean and variance of the market 
prices. On the vertical axes are the thirteen groups, starting with the six Cobweb groups. On the horizontal 
axes the end of the test sample is indicated, starting right after the Phases of Entry. Graph (a) shows the 
tests for the mean and graph (b) tests for the variance. A dark spot denotes non-rejection of the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis in this case, while a light spot denotes rejection, at 5% significance level. The 
columns of numbers at the right end of the graphs indicate the values of the relevant probability distri-
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Appendix D: Tables 
 
Variable  Estimate  St. Deviation  t Value  p Value 
      
constant 23.19  0.4137  56.05  0.0000 
maximize income (Q1)  0.2387  0.0503  4.746  0.0000 
made effort (Q3)  0.1449  0.0479  3.025  0.0036 
age (Q16)  -0.0376  0.0113  -3.302  0.0016 
study unknown (Q18)  -1.100  0.2739  -4.017  0.0002 
group Cobweb #1  -0.9779  0.1635  -5.981  0.0000 
group Cobweb #2  -2.501  0.1515  -16.51  0.0000 
group Cobweb #3  -3.352  0.1512  -22.18  0.0000 
group Cobweb #4  -1.004  0.1502  -6.685  0.0000 
group Cobweb #5  -1.559  0.1583  -9.849  0.0000 
group Cobweb #6  -2.561  0.1501  -17.05  0.0000 
group Asset Pricing #2  0.481  0.1541  3.119  0.0027 
group Asset Pricing #5  -4.252  0.1517  -28.03  0.0000 
group Asset Pricing #6  -0.7154  0.1503  -4.762  0.0000 
Number of Observations  78     
R Squared (Adjusted)  0.9607 (0.9527) 
F Statistic (P Value)  120.4 (0.0000) 
Minimal P Value of Q Statis-  0.601  (30)     
tics 1 through 32 (at lag)      
 
Table #1: Ordinary least squares regression of the participants' earnings on the quantifiable part 
of the answers to the questionnaire (see Appendix A) and the group membership dummies. Num-
bers following "Q" between parentheses refer to questions of the same number. The significance 
level has been set to 1%, to compensate for the possibility of overestimation due to the relatively 
large number of explanatory variables. Variables have been eliminated by iteratively deleting the 
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2  AC 
           
1  53.67  0.1080  0 0 0 0 0 0.2013  No 
2  29.75  0.7002  0 0 0 -0.1957 0 0.8795  No 
3  25.47  0 0.2431  0 0 0 0 0.0983  No 
4  23.30*  0.4213  0 0 0 0 0 0.1385  No 
5  32.90*  0.3919 -0.3136 0  0.3750 0  0  0.3077 No 
6  39.48  0.3255 0.2009 0  -0.5089  0  0.3240 0.6504 No 
7  87.60  0 0 0 0 -0.1772  -0.2876  0.3478  No 
8  10.26*  0.0111 0  0  0.0306 0  0  0.1912 No 
9  32.15  0.0953  0 0 0 0 0.3662  0.7756  Yes 
10  29.38  0.2818  0.2317  0 0 0 0 0.2821  No 
11  16.13  0.2697  0.1532  0 0 0.3088  0 0.4381  No 
12  20.81  0.6534  0 0 0 0 0 0.5102  No 
13  -0.489*  0.3003  0.4690  0 0 0.2218  0 0.7600  No 
14  59.15  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
15  7.433  0.8692  0 0 0 0 0 0.9412  No 
16  31.26  0 0.4799  0 0 0 0 0.4220  No 
17  -170.6  0 0 0 -1.356  1.538  3.671  0.9670  No 
18  82.00  -0.7656  0.3995  0 0 0 0 0.7943  No 
19  34.40  0.4264  0 0 0 0 0 0.5653  No 
20  45.60  0.2423  0 0 0 0 0 0.3077  No 
21  60.00  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
22  20.97  0.6489  0 0 0 0 0 0.7385  Yes 
23  16.56  0.3326  0.3946  0 0 0 0 0.2316  No 
24  60.00  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
25  44.31  0.2653  0 0 0 0 0 0.2074  No 
26  23.03  -0.2041  0.4658  0 0.3586  0 0 0.6671  No 
27  60.98  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
28  58.89  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
29  45.38  0 0 -0.0898 0 0 0 0.5408  No 
30  5.533*  0.9115  0 0 0 0 0 0.7367  No 
31  5.767*  0.5157  0 0 0 0.3906  0 0.7284  No 
32  27.21  0.4251  0.1179  0 0 0 0 0.6324  No 
33  90.46  0 0 0 0 0 -0.5047  0.2533  No 
34  59.66  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
35  45.71  0.2338  0 0 0 0 0 0.2004  No 
36  60.48  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
 
Table #2: Estimated AdAR prediction rules for the 36 participants of the Cobweb treatment. The 
first column shows the participant's number, clustered according to group. The second through 
eighth column show the estimations of the AdAR parameters, including the constant. The last two 
columns show the R-squared statistic and the report on the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals up to the twentieth order. Insignificant explanatory variables have been eliminated one 
at a time, the one with the largest p value first, until all values were below 5%. An asterisk in the 
second column indicates that the constant is insignificant. 
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1  -0.790*  1.675  0  -0.4329 -0.2324 0  0  0.9965  No 
2 -0.682*  1.340  -0.5007  0  0.4642  -0.2914  0  0.9980  No 
3  -1.176*  1.724  0  -0.3995 -0.3069 0  0  0.9932  No 
4  -1.121  1.893  -0.8748  0 0 0 0 0.9971  No 
5  0.417*  1.443  -0.8745  0 0.4264  0 0 0.9975  No 
6  -0.817*  1.787  -0.7724  0 0 0 0 0.9982  No 
7  0.742*  1.184  0 -0.1698  0 0 0 0.9964  Yes 
8  -0.179*  1.463  -0.4552  0 0 0 0 0.9938  No 
9  0.657*  1.220  -0.7315  0 0.5006  0 0 0.9969  No 
10  0.339*  1.285  0 0 0 -0.2887  0 0.9969  No 
11  0.693*  1.368  -0.8523  0 0.4743  0 0 0.9948  No 
12  0.223*  1.851  0  0  -0.3270 -0.3533 -0.1723 0.9926  No 
13  0.040*  1.450  -0.4504  0 0 0 0 0.9870  No 
14  0.164*  1.069  -0.4708  0 0.4000  0 0 0.9943  No 
15 -0.251*  1.275  -0.2989  -0.2706  0  0.2984  0  0.9981  No 
16  2.170*  1.232  0 0 0 -0.2662  0 0.9780  No 
17  -0.985*  1.251  0 -0.2345  0 0 0 0.9900  No 
18  -0.1026  1.219  -0.5430  0 0.4372  0 0 0.9942  No 
19  2.411  1.084  0 0 0.2635  0 -0.3910  0.9940  No 
20  1.956*  -0.9115  0 0 0 0 0 0.8975  No 
21  1.382  1.641  -0.9729 0 0.3084  0 0 0.9978  No 
22  2.687  1.6274  -0.4900 0 0 0 -0.1816  0.9934  No 
23  1.475  1.441  0 -0.4659 0 0 0 0.9948  No 
24  0.062*  1.943  -0.9439 0 0 0 0 0.9953  No 
25  34.27  0 0.1203  0 0.3421  0.2670  -0.3179  0.9892  Yes 
26  173.7*  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
27  2.601  1.000  0  -0.1972 -0.0384 0.1215 0.0682 1.0000 Yes 
28  4.160  1.005  0 0 0 -0.1025 0 0.9981  No 
29 15.71  1.004  0  0.5544  -0.2446 -0.4973 -0.1217  0.9981  Yes 
30 13.52  1.062  -0.5319 0.3410  0.2280 -0.0978 -0.2084  0.9995 No 
31  2.295*  0.8857 0  -0.4284 0.5064 0  0  0.9866 No 
32  0.7813*  1.117  -0.7796 0 0.6513  0 0 0.9927  No 
33  -0.946*  1.767  -0.8572 0.1052  0 0 0 0.9937  No 
34  8.501*  1.130  0 -0.4372 0 0 0 0.6584  No 
35  1.851  1.182  0 -0.5068 0 0.2952  0 0.9931  Yes 
36  14.01*  0.7478  0 0 0 0 0 0.2058  No 
37  -3.020*  1.0498  0 0 0 0 0 0.9363  No 
38  1.560  0.9728  0 0 0 0 0 0.9316  No 
39  6.501  1.1315  -0.2359 0 0 0 0 0.9656  No 
40  2.584*  1.043  0 0 0 -0.1619 0.0780  0.9719  No 
41  1.739*  1.383  -0.4099 0 0 0 0 0.9443  No 
42  1.113*  0.9327 -0.2968 0  0.3471 0  0  0.9569 No 
 
Table #3: Estimated AdAR prediction rules for the 42 participants of the Asset Pricing treatment. 
See for more information the caption with Table #2. 
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CM1  80.92  -0.3476  0 0 0 0 0 0.1371  No 
CM2  70.91  0 0 -0.1719  0 0 0 0.1063  No 
CM3  59.89  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
CM4  60.05  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
CM5  80.80  -0.3466  0 0 0 0 0 0.1201  No 
CM6  60.09  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000  No 
APM1  2.600  1.699  -0.7409  0 0 0 0 0.9920  No 
APM2  3.392  1.408  -0.4608  0 0 0 0 0.9841  No 
APM3  4.322  0.9315  0 0 0 0 0 0.9676  No 
APM4  4.475  1.352  0 -0.4301  0 0 0 0.9900  No 
APM5  44.20  0.5617  0 0 0 0 0 0.3160  No 
APM6  6.876  1.213  0 -0.4356  0 0 0 0.9311  No 
APM7  22.75  0.8634  0 -0.2297  0 0 0 0.5981  No 
 
Table #4: Autoregressive estimations of the market prices of the 13 groups. The first column 
shows the group treatment and number, "CM" and "APM" being abbreviations for "Cobweb Model" 
and "Asset Pricing Model" respectively. See for more information the caption of Table #2. 
 
Gr.no.  #ERs  AR(1) AR(2) Naive Fundam.  Adaptive  Sh.  Trend 
         
CM1  6 2 0 1 0 2 4 
CM2  5 1 1 0 0 1 2 
CM3  6 1 2 0 1 0 3 
CM4  5 2 1 0 2 0 3 
CM5  6 1 0 1 2 1 4 
CM6  6 1 1 0 2 1 3 
APM1  6 0 2 0 0 0 4 
APM2  5 0 1 0 0 0 2 
APM3  6 0 1 1 0 1 3 
APM4  6 0 1 0 0 0 4 
APM5  3 0 0 0 1 0 1 
APM6  5 1 0 1 0 1 3 
APM7  6 2 2 0 0 0 4 
CM  34  8 5 2 7 5 19 
APM  37  3 7 2 1 2 21 
Total  71 11 12 4  8  7  40 
 
Table #5: Classification of the prediction rules, for each group seperately. The first column shows 
the group treatment and number, "CM" and "APM" being abbreviations for "Cobweb Model" and 
"Asset Pricing Model" respectively. The three bottom rows show totals of the treatments and of 
the experiment as a whole. "Fundam." And "Sh. Trend" are abbreviations for "Fundamentalist" 
and "Shifting Trend". For the meaning of the labels, see footnote 40 and equation 13 in the main 
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1 0.7389  0 0 2 CM1  Naive  Fundamentalist 
2 0 0 0 3 CM1  None 
3 0.9362  0 0 4 CM1  Naive  &  Fundamentalist 
4 0.1350  0.1923  0.0605  5 CM1  Fundamentalist 
5 0.5689  0.3480  0 8 CM2  None 
6 0.5553  0 0 12  CM2  Naive  Fundamentalist 
7 0.7391  0 -0.4444  13  CM3  None 
8 0 0 0 14  CM3  Naive  &  Fundamentalist 
9 -0.3770  0 -0.3762  18  CM3  Naive  Fundamentalist 
10 0.4016  0  0  19 CM4  Naive  Fundamentalist 
11 0  0  0  21 CM4  Fundamentalist 
12 0  0  0  24 CM4  Fundamentalist 
13 0.2633  0  0  25 CM5  Fundamentalist 
14 0  0  0  27 CM5  Naive  &  Fundamentalist 
15 0  0  0  28 CM5  Naive  &  Fundamentalist 
16 0.9101  0  0  30 CM5  Naive 
17 0  0  0  34 CM6  Fundamentalist 
18 0.4321  0  0  35 CM6  None 
19 0  0  0  36 CM6  None 
20 1.5096  -0.5238  0  3  APM1  Naive  Trend  Follower 
21  1.0177  0 0.8591  4 APM1  Naive  Trend  Follower 
22  0.5227  0.4711  0.9118  5  APM1  Adaptive Trend Follower 
23  1.0142  0 0.7818  6 APM1  None 
24  0.4888  0.5000  0.7290  9  APM2  Adaptive Trend Follower 
25 0.4670  0.5269  0.9210  11 APM2  Adaptive  Trend  Follower 
26 0.9994  0  0.4609  13 APM3  Naive  Trend  Follower 
27 0.5369  0.4627  0.5587  14 APM3  Adaptive  Trend  Follower 
28 1.0090  0  0.2765  15 APM3  Naive  Trend  Follower 
29 0.9557  0  0  20 APM4  Naive  Trend  Follower 
30 0.6669  0.3089  0.9696  21 APM4  None 
31 0.9616  0  0.8678  22 APM4  None 
32  0.9989  0  0.9437  24  APM4  Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll. 
33  0  0  0  26  APM5  Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll. 
34 0.2831  0.7045  0.8266  32 APM6  Adaptive  Trend  Follower 
35 1.1366  -0.1226  0.6077  33 APM6  Naive  Trend  Follower 
36 0.7428  0  0  36 APM6  Naive  Trend  Follower 
37 1.0376  0  0  37 APM7  None 
38 0.9419  0  0  38 APM7  None 
39 1.0155  0  0.2907  41 APM7  Naive  Trend  Follower 
40 0.6370  0.3842  0.3182  42 APM7  Adaptive  Trend  Follower 
 
Table #6: Estimated Shifting Trend prediction rules for both treatments. The 1
st column shows the 
participant's number, clustered according to treatment. The 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th column show the esti-
mated STE parameters, calculated by iterative OLS estimation, eliminating the least significant 
variable until all p values were below 5%. This procedure was applied only to the AdAR rules that 
were found to be equivalent to an STE rule, which was determined by using the appropriate Wald 
restriction test at 5% level. The 5
th and 6
th columns show the original number and group of the 
participants, while the 7
th shows a classification of the STE estimations (see footnotes 44 and 45). 